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Abstract
This perspective article analyses the EU’s approach to digital competition policy,
focusing on its investigations into ‘Big Tech’ i.e., Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon,
or GAFA. It assesses the changing nature of competition policy and looks at the
legal and institutional context of the EU’s investigations. Analysing the impact on
stakeholders and the broader policy implications, it concludes that digital regulation
should not be regional and that the inclusion of technology companies coupled with
the establishment of a global framework is necessary for the process of adapting
competition policies for the digital age.
Introduction
On 17th July 2019, the European Commission
(EC) formally opened an antitrust investigation
into Amazon [1]. The term ‘antitrust’ is defined
in the EU’s competition policy publication as
‘the action of preventing or controlling trusts or
other monopolies, always done with the intention
of promoting competition in business’ [2]. This
is the latest in a growing number of global in-
vestigations into the so-called ‘Big Tech’ firms:
Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple (GAFA).
Other notable recent cases include the European
Union’s (EU) combined €8.25 billion fine levied
against Google across three abuse of dominance
cases (Google Shopping in June 2017 [3], Google
Android in July 2018 [4], and Google AdSense in
March 2019 [5]).
While these firms are growing to dominate an
increasing number of markets, the accompany-
ing technological advancement and disruption of
established business models have tested the lim-
its of traditional competition policy, both within
the EU and beyond. This perspective article
examines why traditional competition policy is
not entirely applicable to ‘Big Tech’ by analysing
the legal and institutional environment around
the EU’s antitrust cases against GAFA firms and
their impact on relevant stakeholders. It then
considers the broader policy and industry impli-
cations for digital competition regulation and the
need for global cooperation and standardisation
to effectively ensure competitive digital markets.
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Competition Law in the EU
Antitrust law is a subset of competition law,
which refers to the broader legal framework in a
particular jurisdiction that aims to ensure a fair
and free market to the maximum extent possi-
ble by laying out a set of rules governing anti-
competitive conduct [2]. EU competition law is
derived from Articles 101-109 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [6],
in conjunction with relevant Regulations such as
Regulation 139/2004 (the EC Merger Regulation)
[7] and Regulation 1/2003 [8] (the Modernisation
Regulation) [9]. It encompasses four main policy
areas.
Of these four areas, cartels and anti-competitive
agreements (covered by TFEU Article 101), and
abuse of market dominance (covered by TFEU
Article 102), form the basis of European antitrust
law. ‘Anti-competitive agreements’ are agree-
ments between companies that restrict compe-
tition. These can be vertical, such as between
suppliers and retailers, or horizontal i.e., between
competitors in the same market. The most ex-
treme of these is the formation of ‘cartels’, which
are collusive groups created between companies
who are market competitors, to control prices,
limit production and share markets or customers
amongst themselves [2, 10]. ‘Abuse of a domi-
nant position’ refers to the company exploiting
the strength of its market position to restrict or
eliminate competition [2, 10].Note that a dom-
inant position in itself is not anti-competitive
unless the company in question has exploited it.
This adds a layer of complexity to abuse of domi-
nance investigations, especially when dealing with
GAFA companies, as explicit misuse of market
dominance has to be clearly established.
Thirdly, the law covers merger control, per the
Merger Regulation, which establishes the EC’s
power to prevent mergers or acquisitions that
threaten to restrict competition. Finally, TFEU
Article 107 deals with Member State aid control,
prohibiting the Member States from using public
funds to influence markets by investing in or oth-
erwise granting financial advantages to private
undertakings [2, 10].EU competition law applies
to the 27 Member States and the 3 non-member
countries in the European Economic Area (EEA)
- Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway - in conjunc-
tion with their national laws [10]. Regulation
1/2003 also set up the European Competition
Network (ECN) as a platform for further co-
operation, and obligated national competition
authorities (NCAs) and courts to consistently en-
force TFEU 101 and 102 across the EU and EEA
[9].
Competition Policy in a Digital
World
‘Competition policy’ refers to the application and
enforcement of the rules set out by competition
law [2]. Definitions and enforcement are specific
to individual jurisdictions (such as individual na-
tions and transnational blocs like the EU), as
there are no binding multilateral standards or
agreements. However, organisations such as the
International Competition Network (ICN), the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD) and the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
facilitate international dialogue and discussion to
encourage global regulatory standardisation [11].
The original definitions of anti-competitive be-
haviour were established for traditional business
models, where it was possible to demarcate mar-
kets for different industries [11]. They were also
firmly set in price theory, as consumer welfare
and harm were broadly considered in monetary
terms [12]. For instance, consumers were be-
ing harmed if they were being forced to pay a
higher price than was fair without any alterna-
tives. Identifying a dominant player as one who
held the greater market share or classifying inter-
business agreements as collusive in nature was
thus more straightforward. It was also easier to
define anti-competitive activities, such as price-
fixing (an agreement between rival sellers to raise
or fix prices to restrict competition and increase
profits [13]). A well-known case of collusive agree-
ments is the famous 1961 electrical equipment
price-fixing case in the United States. Multiple
high-profile electrical equipment manufacturers
including General Electric and Westinghouse were
charged and indicted by a Philadelphia grand jury
with having colluded to ‘raise, fix and maintain’
the prices of equipment estimated to be worth
$1.7 billion annually [14].
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The digital revolution has fundamentally altered
the nature of markets and industries, creating
more fluid business models and leading to new
obstacles for the enforcement of competition law.
For example, ‘zero-price’ services such as social
media [12] require considerations beyond mone-
tary repercussions to customers. GAFA business
models are now increasingly platform-based, act-
ing as intermediaries that facilitate transactions
between different user groups. They serve differ-
ent sets of users in different ways, with different
pricing models for each [15]. Additionally, they
are no longer confined to a single industry. For
example, Amazon’s e-commerce business places
it in the traditional industries of retail, logistics,
manufacturing and advertising, whilst also having
a completely different business model as an online
marketplace of physical and virtual goods, along
with its software businesses. Similarly, Google
operates in the sectors of internet search, adver-
tising, software development and analytics, to
name but a few. Companies no longer operate in
industries, but ecosystems.
This makes it difficult to (a) define a particular
market, and (b) establish a company’s position in
it from a revenue perspective, especially with the
‘zero-price’ nature of digital services [12] (such
as social media, retail product comparisons and
travel booking searches), which compete for cus-
tomers’ attention rather than their money. In the
absence of clear revenue gains, identifying a domi-
nant market player or defining collusive behaviour
is significantly more difficult. This complexity is
compounded by the fact that GAFA companies,
which often own the largest online platform mar-
ketplaces, also compete in them. Thus, a creative
and flexible approach is required to justify the
application of competition frameworks to digital
markets.
The EU released a report on how competition pol-
icy should evolve for the digital era in April 2019,
which concluded that while the existing legal
framework of competition law was still sufficient,
enforcement methods would need re-thinking to
keep pace with the digital economy [16]. It is also
the most active jurisdiction in bringing regulatory
action against technology firms. According to a
global Hogan Lovells survey on proposed digital
regulation, 49% of the 452 entries recorded for the
first half of 2019 were from the EU, with the US
displaying its recent surge in digital regulation in
second place at 28%. Antitrust regulation was
the largest category overall, with 26% of the total
proposals being competition-related [17].
Notable Cases
Google has been the subject of three high-profile
EC investigations so far: Google Shopping in
June 2017 [3], Google Android in July 2018 [4],
and Google AdSense in March 2019 [5]. In all
three cases, it was charged with abuse of domi-
nance and fined by the EC under TFEU 102. In
the Android decision, Google was charged with re-
strictive practices for demanding pre-installation
of proprietary apps on devices using the Android
operating system [4]. The AdSense decision found
the company guilty of forcing third-party websites
using its advertising service to do so exclusively
and prominently [5]. The Shopping case acknowl-
edged Google’s dominance in the online search
market but penalised it for abusing this position
in a supplementary market, i.e. the online shop-
ping comparison market, by prioritising its own
results above those of its competitors [3].
The validity of these claims has been disputed
in the legal community, and critics stress the ne-
cessity of establishing a firm causal link between
simply being in a dominant position and being
found guilty of abusing it [18]. In this matter,
the Android and AdSense cases were potentially
stronger [18], as Google’s restrictive practices in
the first and insistence on exclusivity in the sec-
ond broadly fit the criteria for anti-competitive
conduct.
The Shopping case is more contentious. It pe-
nalised Google for abusing its position in a dif-
ferent market than the one it was claimed to be
dominant in, which made the causal link between
the two less clear. Google has stated that not only
were its own results marked as ‘advertisements’
[18], but online marketplaces such as Amazon
and eBay are equally prominent in this regard
and therefore competition was enforceable with
a single click, given the ‘zero-price’ nature and
subsequent low switching costs of the market in
question [19, 20].
It is important to view the three cases discussed
above in the context of the limitations of the
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EU’s jurisdiction as well as the scale at which
companies like Google operate. The EU has an
administrative enforcement system. For compe-
tition cases, this is led by the EC, whose role is
to investigate cases, announce a decision (and/or
a settlement) and propose remedies, which the
defendant can then accept or appeal [10]. By
contrast, other jurisdictions such as the United
States (US) have a more adjudicative system,
with both parties (the investigating agency and
the defendant) presenting their case and reme-
dies and/or penalties being decided by the courts.
The former relies more on financial sanctions,
while in the latter criminal sanctions are also a
realistic possibility [21]. However, the EC’s fines
are capped at 10% of a company’s global annual
turnover, and within that, to 30% of revenue re-
lated to the infringement multiplied by years of
participation [22]. While this still allows the EC
to levy fines in billions of euros, it is important
to consider whether this has significant impact,
given the scale of the companies involved. For
instance, Alphabet (Google’s parent company)
listed the €4.34 billion Android fine (a mere 3.7%
of Google’s annual revenue) under standard costs
and expenses in its 2018 annual statement [23].
This renders the effectiveness of financial sanc-
tions on the multi-billion dollar GAFA companies
questionable.
Another notable case, albeit at the Member State
level, is the German Federal Cartel Office’s (FCO)
abuse of dominance decision against Facebook in
February 2019. The FCO found Facebook’s col-
lection and leveraging of user data beyond its
own website to be an abuse of its dominance as
a social network. In a landmark ruling, the Düs-
seldorf Higher Regional Court (the first court of
appeal) suspended this decision, stating that even
if Facebook was found to have violated data pro-
tection law by its actions, it did not automatically
constitute anti-competitive conduct simply due
to its dominant position [24]. Investigations con-
ducted by Member State NCAs such as the FCO
are important as they can supplement current or
upcoming EC cases if they are investigating the
same company, which gives the EU’s antitrust in-
vestigations a level of coordination that is absent
from other jurisdictions [9].
Currently, Amazon is being investigated [1] for its
dual role as a retailer in its own marketplace, i.e.
selling goods on a platform that the company it-
self owns. The EC is investigating whether it has
used confidential data from retailers on its plat-
form to its advantage (to price its own products
lower and position them better in searches), either
by abusing its position over them (TFEU 102) or
by colluding with them (TEFU 101) [25]. This
case is similar to Google’s cases in that both these
companies are online gatekeepers as well as mar-
ket players i.e., they control the very interfaces
that they compete in. It also has parallels to Face-
book’s case where the alleged anti-competitive
behaviour stems from infringement of protected
data. However, in Amazon’s case, the causal link
to abuse of dominance would be more direct than
Facebook’s case, as the data was allegedly used
to directly undermine competitors [26]. In many
of these notable cases against different GAFA
firms, conducted by different authorities across
the EU and worldwide, comparisons can be drawn.
This helps give weight to the argument that it is
possible to develop a more standardised global
framework to help different jurisdictions, even be-
yond the EU, to effectively regulate competition
in digital markets.
Role of institutions
The EU’s competition rules are applied and en-
forced by the authority of the EC. Within the EC,
the Directorate-General (DG) Competition is the
department responsible for direct enforcement. It
can open investigations on its own initiative or
based on complaints registered. Based on the
result of the investigations, the EC can prohibit
the discovered anti-competitive conduct, impose
fines, and require remedial actions. For exam-
ple, in the AdSense decision, the EC stated that
Google had ceased the problematic conduct by
that time [5], and in the Shopping and Android
decisions, Google was given 90 days to cease the
stated conduct or face penalty payments of up to
5% of Alphabet’s average daily global turnover
[3, 4].
The EC usually investigates cases that impact
three or more Member States, or where the situ-
ation necessitates an EU-level precedent. Cases
involving dominant technology platform compa-
nies like GAFA usually fulfil both criteria (Google
was concluded to possess over 90% market share
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in most or all EEA countries). For cases within
a Member State or between two of them, the
respective NCAs are better suited and can in-
dependently enforce competition rules in their
respective jurisdictions [2, 10]. This is reflected
in recent independent NCA investigations, such
as the German FCO’s Facebook decision [24] and
the 2018 and 2019 investigations into Amazon ini-
tiated by the FCO [27] and the Austrian Federal
Competition Authority (FCA) [28] respectively.
Should the EC initiate proceedings into the sub-
ject of an NCA investigation on the same charge,
the respective NCA will lose its authority to inves-
tigate further to the EC (although it can pursue
parallel investigations) per Regulation 1/2003 [9].
The EU’s General Court and the (higher) Court
of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) have the
power to annul or modify EC decisions. Compa-
nies and Member State governments periodically
launch appeals against EC decisions and have
sometimes seen successful outcomes in the past
[2]. National courts have the same power for deci-
sions by respective NCAs, as seen in Facebook’s
success with an interim decision in the Düsseldorf
Higher Regional Court. However, final decisions
in both cases are expected to take considerable
time, and challenging complex EC decisions of
magnitude is a lengthy and drawn out procedure.
For example, Google has appealed the EC’s deci-
sion in each of its cases, with the hearings for the
first case, Google Shopping, starting in February
2020 [29], almost 10 years after the investigation
was first opened. The decision could take years,
and in the meantime, Google has to comply with
the EC’s decisions proposed remedies to limit
anti-competitive conduct [30].
This system is thus far from ideal for the fast-
moving digital ecosystem. The lack of precedence
or any formal guidance that could serve as a ref-
erence further slows down the process, since most
cases are treated as novel, and arguments already
established in parallel (but not identical) cases
have to be reformulated. Again, this is where a
standardised enforcement framework for apply-
ing competition law to digital models is essential,
both to the investigating authorities and to the
organisation under investigation.
The impact of increased regula-
tion
Antitrust investigations invariably involve a large
number of stakeholders, both in industry and in
government. As discussed above, ‘Big Tech’ firms
operate in an ecosystem of multiple adjacent in-
dustries and have a huge global presence, with
most of the market-leading digital platforms op-
erating in over 100 countries. Furthermore, the
EU’s recent investigations have set precedents as
they are the first of their kind into GAFA firms,
leading to divided public and legal opinions on
the validity of some of the charges (such as the
abuse of dominance charges in the Google Shop-
ping and Facebook cases detailed above), and a
series of appeals from the companies themselves.
Thus, these investigations and their outcomes
have a significant impact, not only on the par-
ties directly involved (the EU governing bodies,
Member State governments, firms and competi-
tors) but also on other jurisdictions, consumer
welfare groups, international competition policy
organisations and the broader legal community.
The new EC of 2019 has made robust policy
for digital markets a priority. President von der
Leyen has stated as much in her agenda [31]
and has charged Competition Commissioner Mar-
grethe Vestager with the responsibility of shaping
a ‘Europe Fit for a Digital Age’ [32]. The EU
already leads globally in this regard, and its posi-
tion as the first mover could lead to other national
and international standards being framed accord-
ingly. This is reflected in the various regional
data protection regulations such as the Califor-
nia Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) of 2020, that
have been modelled after the EU’s 2018 General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [17]. Thus,
the cases discussed above are crucial not only in
terms of their outcomes but in helping to cre-
ate a blueprint to regulate digital and ‘zero-price’
business models.
However, the EU’s agenda has been critiqued
as tending towards protectionism and stretch-
ing competition law to target companies sim-
ply for being successful [33]. These critiques
bear some thought given Commissioner Vestager’s
statements that the EC will consider more far-
reaching tools such as ‘interim measures’ to force
Cambridge Journal of Science & Policy, Vol 1 (2020), Issue 2 5
Competition policy in the age of ‘Big Tech’: Assessing the EU’s approach
companies to cease suspected anti-competitive be-
haviour during an investigation and not after, or
shifting the burden of proof onto dominant com-
panies to prove pro-competitive conduct [34, 35].
The heightened scrutiny on ‘Big Tech’ has also
spurred other countries into action. Chief among
them is the US, with multiple investigations
against GAFA companies being launched in the
last year at both the federal level by the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and the state level by many
state Attorneys General’s (AGs) [32]. Digital
regulation has also become a hallmark of many
political platforms - a turnaround from the US’s
relatively minimalist approach so far [32].The UK
government has also stated that they are looking
to adopt recommendations by the UK’s Compe-
tition and Markets Authority (CMA) to enable
effective regulation [36].
For the GAFA companies, the multitude of inves-
tigations requires them to be constantly vigilant
for a change in the competition policy and the
enforcement in any particular jurisdiction. They
then have to adapt according to the investiga-
tions at hand to minimise potential fallout. For
example, in 2015, Google restructured itself to
create a holding company (Alphabet Inc.) and
listed itself as a subsidiary. This enabled it to sep-
arate its chief revenue-generating arms of search
and advertising from its other less crucial busi-
nesses [37]. Amazon agreed to amend its terms
of service with sellers on its platform to appease
the two Member State authorities investigating
it [38]. GAFA companies are thus attempting to
minimise potential fallout in various ways. While
they are often successful since they have the ca-
pacity and resources to do so, it makes them less
likely to cooperate with information-gathering
or knowledge-sharing attempts should any gov-
ernment attempt them, as these can easily turn
investigative in nature.
Another unintended consequence of a piecemeal
approach to regulating digital competition is that
the burden of increased and rapidly evolving regu-
lation can fall disproportionately on smaller tech-
nology companies, as they lack the resources and
public affairs experience to keep up [17]. Al-
though many of these companies, especially Eu-
ropean ones, were among those who filed com-
plaints to start the GAFA investigations, by most
accounts the remedial measures are proving in-
effective, with the ‘Big Tech’ companies find-
ing workarounds and newer areas of expansion
while simultaneously appealing every decision [39].
Thus, these companies might be benefited from
industry partnerships, trade coalitions and advo-
cacy groups instead of relying solely on regulatory
frameworks.
Broader implications and con-
clusion
This shift to increased enforcement and vigilance
in digital competition policy has long-lasting
implications, both within the EU and globally.
The national scope of regulation so far is espe-
cially concerning - per the aforementioned Hogan
Lovells survey, 85% of all tracked proposals were
at a national level [17]. Thus, a standardised
global framework to help jurisdictions enforce
competition policy is still a long way off. This is
highly problematic since a long-term consequence
could be global regulatory fragmentation, with
different rules in different national digital mar-
kets. This can prove highly detrimental to global
trade, especially where the sharing or exchange of
data across jurisdictions is concerned, and could
result in reduced choices for consumers. The in-
ternational community needs to recognise that
this is not a region-specific issue, and regional
policing of digital ecosystems is therefore not a
sustainable or an enforceable solution. Further,
the EU should consider that an overly complex
and drawn-out approach to enacting competition
legislation is as difficult to enforce for them as
it is for the companies in question to adhere to.
As discussed above, GAFA companies are becom-
ing increasingly adept at finding workarounds to
sidestep any substantial changes or restrictions
to their operating models and by extension, their
revenue. This increases the potential for non-
compliance and could realistically lead to more
companies subverting the legal system if similar
cases continue to be brought in this piecemeal
fashion.
Authorities also need to remember that digital
business models can vary and thus cannot be reg-
ulated using a single template, as it requires a
ground-up approach to enforcement which is both
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time-consuming and resource-intensive. Govern-
ments should, therefore, take an adaptable and
inclusive approach to digital regulation. The EU
cases against GAFA companies have proven that
traditional remedies such as fines are unlikely to
be a sustainable solution, and extreme remedies
such as ‘breaking up’ large companies might serve
little purpose other than to create a larger set of
smaller monopolies, which would be even harder
to regulate [23]. The true barrier to effective
regulation, then, is a lack of transparency in the
operating models of these firms as well as the
precise legal violations that they have commit-
ted. Much of the divide in public opinion on
GAFA companies stems from the complete opac-
ity in their operations [40]. An alternative to
the current case-by-case investigatory approach
employed by individual jurisdictions could be to
include technology companies in the global stan-
dardisation process, and foster compliance by
design in digital products and services so that po-
tential concerns are addressed from the onset. If
a benchmark for regulatory compliance in digital
ecosystems is established and accepted by both
the regulators and the industry, then both new
and existing products can be held accountable to
it.
To conclude, since the EU is regarded as a trend-
setter in technological regulation, it should lever-
age its influence to push for an inclusive and
sustainable global framework to approach it. The
EU’s own legal and policy framework, both at
a national and trans-national level, allows for a
fair degree of coordination between multiple com-
petition authorities, and can serve as a starting
point in envisioning an inter-jurisdictional frame-
work for the enforcement of competition policy in
digital ecosystems. The rapid adoption of digital
ecosystems globally has made global practices for
adapting existing legal frameworks a necessity.
Coupled with pragmatic and flexible enforcement,
industry cooperation and a mechanism for inter-
jurisdictional coordination, a global framework
will be instrumental in preventing the regional
fragmentation of digital ecosystems and the subse-
quent consequences to the global economy going
forward.
© 2020 The Author. Published by the Cambridge
University Science & Policy Exchange under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/,
which permits unrestricted use, provided the original
author and source are credited.
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